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UNDERGROUND GAS STORAGE:
ECONOMIC NEEDS AND A PROPOSED




Gas storage is necessary to equate the supply and demand for gas in
different parts of the United States. Most areas of the country lack suffi-
cient native gas supplies to meet their own demands for consumption, and
commercial natural gas produced mainly in the southwest must be
shipped to all parts of the country.' The primary and most economical
means of shipment is by pipelines.2 But during the winter months pipe-
lines carrying capacity loads are incapable of meeting the demand for gas,
especially for residential space heating. Contrariwise, capacity far exceeds
demand during the warmer periods. 3
This problem might be alleviated if industrial service were placed on an
interruptable basis4 and concentrated in the summer months, thus making
available greater amounts of gas for residential consumption during the
winter. But frequently this technique will not be a feasible solution because
*Mr. Winnick is a member of the Editorial Board of Prospectus. Mr. Winnick grate-
fully acknowledges the critical advice of Professor Joseph R. Julin, Associate
Dean of the University of Michigan Law School; Charles McDugald of the
Illinois Bar; Joseph Hancock, Vice President of the Natural Gas Pipeline Com-
pany of America; and Walter Nelson of the Michigan Bar.
1 Figures in BUREAU OF STATISTICS, AMERICAN GAS ASSOCIATION, GAS FACTS 33
(1967) indicate that in 1965 the Mountain and West South Central States had a
marketed production of 13,906,323 million cubic feet of natural gas, whereas
the country as a whole had a total marketed production of 16,039,753 million
cubic feet.
2 According to Wagner, Transportation by Pipeline, in LECTURES ON OIL AND GAS
LAw 3 (1954), transportation by pipelines costs only about one-third of the
cost of shipment by railroad.
3 Todd, Progress in Gas Storage, in ECONOMICS OF THE GAS INDUSTRY 170-77
(1962).
4 "Interruptable service" has been defined as:
Low priority service offered to customers under
schedules or contracts which anticipate and
permit interruption on short notice, generally in
peak-load seasons, by reason of the claim of
firm service customers and higher priority users.
Unlike Off-Peak Service, gas is available at any
time of the year if the supply is sufficient. GAS
FACTS supra note 1, at 246.
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industrial and/or residential demand might be too great during the peak
winter period and bargain prices will have to be offered to induce industrial
acceptance of such service.5
The solution to the problem of creating a supply system which will meet
radical fluctuations in seasonal demand lies in the storage of gas after
transportation through the pipelines so that the supply may be varied with
the demand at the consumer markets. Aboveground storage of gas in arti-
ficial containers is not a feasible storage technique due to high costs,6 fire
and explosion hazards, 7 and the limited capacities of such facilities.8 In
view of the inability of aboveground containers to satisfy the tremendous
demand in many parts of the country for storage gas on the coldest days, 9
underground storage appears to be the only practical and economical way
of storing large commercial quantities of gas. 10
However, current law frequently presents significant obstacles to expe-
ditious- development of underground gas storage projects. Some jurisdic-
tions have held that title to gas injected for storage is lost and that the gas
can rightfully be appropriated by the owner of the mineral rights in the
storage tract if storage rights have not been previously obtained."1 Adher-
5 Litz, Underground Storage of Natural Gas in the Appalachian Area, 68 W. VA. L.
REV. 136, 137 (1966).
o As quoted in Stamm, Legal Problems of the Underground Storage of Natural Gas,
36 TEX. L. REV. 161, n. 17 (1957), it was reported in GAS AGE, Nov. 18,
1954 at 35 that unit costs for investment per 1,000 cubic feet of gas for the
different types of storage facilities were: Underground storage-$0.40; Lique-
fication-$20.00; High pressure bottle-$50.00; Gas Holders & Spheres-
$175.00 to $200.00.
7 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 222 (1964).
S.According to Professor Donald Katz, aboveground artificial containers could only
hold about three to five million cubic feet of gas. The Six Lakes Storage Field,
which is Michigan's largest natural storage reservoir, holds close to 55 billion
cubic feet of gas. Interview with Professor Donald Katz, Department of Chemical
& Metallurgical Engineering, University of Michigan, in Ann Arbor, Michigan.
January 25, 1968.
0 During one day in January 1968, for example, Michigan Consolidated Gas Com-
pany and its affiliated companies withdrew 2.5 billion cubc feet of gas from
its storage reservoirs to meet consumer demands. It has been estimated, more-
over, that on cold winter days, 60-65% of the gas distributed to retail customers
in Michigan is taken from underground storage reservoirs, while the remaining
35-40% comes directly from the pipelines. Id.
10 This is confirmed by the tremendous growth of gas storage in natural reservoirs.
By December 31, 1966, the total reservoir capacity for underground storage of
gas in the country exceeded 4.4 trillion cubic feet. Storage installations in 25
states actually contained over 3.2 trillion cubic feet of gas on that date. These
figures indicate a remarkable increase from the 3.4 trillion cubic feet of reservoir
capacity existing in 1962, and the less than 2.5 trillion cubic feet actually in
storage on December 31, 1962. COMMITTEE ON UNDERGROUND STORAGE,
AMERICAN GAS ASSOCIATION, THE UNDERGROUND STORAGE OF GAS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA 6 (1966).
11 Hammonds v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 255 Ky. 685, 75 S.W.2d 204
(1934); Bezzi v. Hocker, 370 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1966).
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ence to this rule could economically prohibit storage operations and sig-
nificantly inflate retail gas prices. Other jurisdictions have rejected this
rule of capture and have held that title to the gas injected for storage
remains in the injector. 12 However, this approach does not insulate the
storage operator from liability for trespass when the gas migrates into
subterranean areas in which it has no property rights. Gas storage is further
restricted by eminent domain statutes which proscribe condemnation unless
a high percentage of the needed storage rights have been acquired through
voluntary agreements. Such legislation encourages landowners to demand
exorbitant compensation for their storage rights and to delay development
of storage projects. It may also encourage storage operators deliberately
to forego acquisition of all storage rights before storage operations are
undertaken. In such event, a trespass action, due to its expense and the
burden of proof problems, may not be effective to vindicate the rights of
landowners who have not been compensated for their storage rights. This
article will analyze the practical effects of various ways to circumvent these
legal obstacles and will propose a basic statutory solution.
I. Acquisition of Storage Rights
The problems of ownership of migrated gas and possible liability in
trespass would be virtually eliminated if those injecting gas into under-
ground reservoirs for storage purposes purchased, leased, or condemned
storage rights in enough land to hold their gas.
Frequently, the storage operator can predetermine with relative certainty
the lands in which storage rights have to be obtained. When, as is most
common, depleted oil or gas fields are used for storage, 13 gas companies
know to the cubic foot how much native gas or oil has been removed
according to the records of the producing wells.' 4 From dry wells previ-
ously drilled beyond the periphery of the reservoir, they can determine
under what lands the reservoir lies. It should be noted, however, that
without the benefit of records or pre-existing wells, it may be difficult to
make such a predetermination in the case of acquifers. Core analysis15 in
12White v. New York State Natural Gas Corp., 190 F. Supp. 342 (W.D. Pa. 1960);
Lone Star Gas Co. v. Murchison, 353 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1962).
13 Of 303 storage pools in use in 1966, 264 were depleted oil and/or gas fields. All
but two of the remaining pools were originally water-bearing sands, or acquifers.
See THE UNDERGROUND STORAGE OF GAS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
at 6, 13, supra note 10.
14 Interview with Professor Kenneth Landes, Department of Geology, University of
Michigan, in Ann Arbor, Michigan, January 24, 1968.
15 Core analysis is obtained by drilling out small cores of rock during the drilling of
exploration or exploitation wells. The cores are then analyzed in laboratories
for data regarding the porosity, permeability, and oil saturation of the rock.
K. LANDES, PETROLEUM GEOLOGY 187 (2d ed. 1959).
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itself will not provide sufficient information, and the cost of drilling ade-
quate observation wells may be prohibitive.1 6
A. Through Voluntary Agreements
While it may not be perfectly clear whose interest must be obtained in
any particular piece of property (the fee of which may be divided into
surface and mineral interests and present and future interests), the serious-
ness of this problem has been exaggerated in the legal literature.' 7 In
jurisdictions with case law directly on the question of whether surface or
mineral owners must be compensated for storage rights, the problem is no
more than one of careful title searching. If the question is unresolved, it
would seem that compensation of the mineral owner would afford adequate
protection to the gas injector, for the surface owner in this situation has
no right to withdraw the gas from the ground. Moreover, a trespass action
by the surface owner would probably result in an award of only nominal
damages, since the storage gas causes no real harm to his interests. In any
case, both mineral and surface owners could ordinarily be compensated
without incurring excessive expenses for storage rights.I 8
As a rule, compensation for the voluntary acquisition of storage rights
should not render storage projects economically unfeasible. Except in cases
where the storage operator seeks to drill wells and lay pipelines in a par-
ticular piece of land, the only interest which need be acquired in that land
is an easement many hundreds of feet under the ground. 19 For the most
part, therefore, the price of storage rights has been anything but excessive. 20
16 Interview with Joseph Hancock, Vice President, Natural Gas Pipeline Company
of America, and Charles McDugald, member of the Illinois Bar, in Chicago,
June 26, 1968.
17 E.g., 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 7, § 222; Scott, Underground Stor-
age of Natural Gas: A Study of Legal Problems, 19 OKLA. L. REV. 47, 57
(1966).
18 Presently, the State of Michigan demands $1.00 per acre per year for gas storage
rights when the State owns surface rights in a piece of land and an additional
$0.25 per acre per year for a gas lease to the storage formation when the
mineral rights are also State-owned. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, MICHIGAN
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, GAS STORAGE LEASE - BASIC TERMS.
'9 Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Buckles, 24 III.2d 520, 532-33, 182 N.E.2d 169,
176 (1962).
20 In parts of northern Michigan, for example, where much of the land is used only
for growing trees, Michigan Consolidated Gas Company has paid only five
dollars per acre for deeds to storage rights in fee, including rights of ingress
and egress. An additional five dollars per acre has been paid in advance for any
possible damages which might result. Interview with Professor Katz, supra note
8. In Kentucky, on the other hand, the custom has been to pay fifty cents per
acre per year for storage rights. Milby v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 375
S.W.2d 237 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963); Cornwell v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas
Co., 249 S.W.2d 531 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952). Storage rights for Iowa's first
significant storage project were acquired for five dollars per acre for the first
year and two dollars per acre for each year thereafter, but such compensation
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When depleted gas fields are used as storage reservoirs, storage opera-
tors must customarily compensate mineral owners (and surface owners
retaining a royalty interest in the minerals) for native gas 2 1 remaining in
the formation as well as for storage rights.2 2 This may drastically drive up
acquisition costs for storage reservoirs. 23 Balancing this added expense to
the gas company, however, is the function that the remaining native gas
serves as cushion gas2 4 to maintain reservoir pressures, thereby reducing
the amount of gas which the storage operator must inject for this purpose.
In practice, therefore, a gas company will not wait until a reservoir is com-
pletely depleted before acquiring the necessary rights.2 5 Furthermore, al-
though all the remaining native gas is useful for storage operations, the
gas company may be able to negotiate a low price for it because not all
of the native gas would have been commercially recoverable by the min-
eral owner.
B. Through Condemnation
If gas companies are unable to acquire sufficient storage rights through
negotiations, almost every gas storage state has legislation specifically pro-
viding for the condemnation of needed storage rights by gas companies. 26
also covered rights of ingress and egress for conducting tests along the surface
of the land. Pitsenbarger v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 198 F. Supp. 665
(S.D. Iowa 1961).21 "Native gas" may be defined as gas indigenous to the reservoir in which it is found.
22 In common situations where the fee owner has conveyed mineral rights under
a royalty agreement whereby he is to receive compensation for a certain pro-
portion, usually one-eighth, of the minerals produced, the storage operator may
acquire the native gas by negotiating for seven-eighths of it with the mineral
owner and for one-eighth with the surface owner.
23The costs of acquiring native gas will, of course, vary with the estimated amounts
of gas in place within the formation and with the give and take of negotiations
between gas company and individual. Attorney Russell Otterbine, who has sold
considerable of his mineral interests in Michigan to gas companies for storage
purposes, reports that he has been compensated between $15 and $50 per acre
for native oil and gas in place, while storage rights in fee in the same lands
were purchased for between $15 and $20 per acre. Interview with Russell
Otterbine of the Michigan Bar, February 22, 1968.24 Unlike "working gas", which is regularly injected and withdrawn for use,
Cushion gas is that gas which normally is left
in a storage reservoir at the end of the with-
drawal season in which maximum use of the
reservoir was made. Cushion gas is needed to
maintain a reservoir pressure high enough to
provide the desired gas flow rate from the wells
at the critical withdrawal period. D. KATZ, R.
TEK, K. COATS, UNDERGROUND STORAGE OF
NATURAL GAS 84 (1965).
25 Interview with Ray Markel, member of the Michigan Bar in Clark Lake, Michigan,
February 23, 1968.26 ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-901 to 53-907 (Supp. 1967); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 100-9-3 to 100-9-7 (1963); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 93-801 to 93-810 (Supp. 1967);
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In the absence of such statutes, it is not entirely clear whether storage
rights may be condemned. 27
Many obstacles within the condemnation statutes are rather insubstan-
tial. Most legislation, for example, only permits condemnation of land for
storage purposes if it is necessary, 28 or reasonably necessary, 2 9 or may
reasonably be expected to be penetrated by the storage gas. 30 But necessity
may be shown simply by demonstrating that the rights sought to be con-
demned are located within the boundaries of a storage reservoir which will
supply gas for public consumption. 3 1 If strictly applied, this requirement
could mean that the gas companies would be unable to condemn "protec-
tive acreage", often acquired to contain slight migrations of gas beyond
the perimeter of the reservoir. Courts, however, are not unaware of the
desirability of securing storage rights in reasonable protective acreage. Ac-
cordingly, the problem would not seem to be a serious one.3 2 In any case,
if gas migrates to these fringe lands after injection, they will thereby be
rendered necessary for storage purposes and hence subject to condemnation.
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-701 (Supp. 1967); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 104, H 104-105 (Supp.
1967); IND. ANN. STAT. H8 3-1729 to 3-1733 (Supp. 1966); IOWA CODE § 490.25
(Supp. 1966); KAN. STAT. ANN. H§ 55-1203 to 55-1205 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 278.502 (Supp. 1966); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:22 (Supp. 1967); MIcH.
COMP. LAWS § 486.252 (1948); Mo. ANN. STAT. tit. 25. § 393.430 (Supp.
1967); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 60-802 to 60-804 (1962); NEB. REV. STAT.
3H 57-601 to 57-607 (Supp. 1965); N. M. STAT. ANN. H§ 65-9-1 to 65-9-7
(Supp. 1967); N. Y. CONSERV. § § 85-86 (McKinney 1967); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4161.17 (Page 1965); OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 36.3 (Supp. 1967); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 52, § 2401 (1966); Ch. 201, § 1-9, 1963 WASH. SESSION LAWS 1002-07;
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-1-2 (1966).
27 In the well-known case of Strain v. Cities Service Gas Co., 148 Kan. 393, 83 P.2d
124 (1938), the Supreme Court of Kansas held that a Kansas statute providing
that land could be condemned for the use of oil companies, pipeline companies,
and for the piping of gas did not embrace condemnation for underground
storage. This case has been interpreted to mean that condemnation of storage
rights is not possible unless expressly provided for by statute. Discussion Notes,
1 0. & G. R. 1172 (1952). Undoubtedly, it was this understanding of the case
which ultimately led to the proliferation of eminent domain statutes specifically
for underground storage.
The holding, however, has been severely criticized, and it has been suggested
that courts might reach different results with similarly broad eminent domain
statutes. Errebo, Condemnation of Depleted Underground Gas Strata for Gas
Storage Purposes, 20 OKLA. B. A. J. 1186, 1192-93 (1949).
2SlND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1732 (Supp. 1966); N. Y. CONSERV. § 86 (McKinney 1967);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4161.17 (Page 1964).
29W. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-1-2 (1966).
3 0 MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 60-803 (1962); OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 36.3 (Supp.
1967).
31 Iroquois Gas Corp. v. Gernatt, 50 Misc.2d 1028, 1033; 272 N.Y.S.2d 291, 297-98
(N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1966), afl'd, 28 A.D.2d 911, 281 N.Y.S.2d 896 (1967).
32 Language in some of the statutory formulations certainly appears to recognize,
if only implicitly, the need for condemning protective acreage. The Montana
statute, for example, states:
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Other statutory obstacles to condemnation represent a deliberate public
policy to protect other natural resources. In this category are statutory
provisions that storage rights may not be condemned if gas storage would
interfere with the production of native mineral resources such as coal and
water, 33 or if native oil and gas in the reservoir remain recoverable in
commercial quantities. 34
Compensation for the condemnation of storage rights is not likely to
be inordinately high:
The measure of damages in a condemna-
tion proceeding is "just compensation"
and this is generally determined by the
fair market value of the property taken.3 5
As in the case of pipelines, 3 6 the property taken is usually only a subter-
ranean easement.3 7 While condemnation awards should also include com-
pensation for damages caused to the residue of the property by appropri-
ation of the storage easement, 38 this type of damage does not often occur,
especially when there are no wells on the property. Even more important,
The value to the owner of the property
taken or damaged for his particular pur-
poses, or its value to the condemnor for
some special use, have been rejected in
favor of the market value of the property
Only such area of such underground sand for-
mation or stratum as may reasonably be ex-
pected to be penetrated by gas displaced or
injected into such underground gas storage
reservoir may be appropriated hereunder. (Em-
phasis added) MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §
60-803 (1962).
The New York statute explicitly provides that protective acreage may be con-
demned. N. Y. CONSERV. § 86 (McKinney 1967).
3 3 E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 104, § 105 (Supp. 1967); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 486.252
(1948); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 2401 (1966); Ch. 201, § 5 1963 WASH.
SESSION LAWS 1005.
34E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 104, § 105 (Supp. 1967); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 60-803 (1962); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 65-9-4 (Supp. 1967); OKLA. STAT. tit.
52, § 36.3 (Supp. 1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 2401 (1966); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 54-1-2 (1966).
35 Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Buckles, 24 11l.2d 520, 531, 182 N.E.2d 169,
175 (1962).
364 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 14.244(5) (3rd rev. ed. 1965).
37 Peonles Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Buckles, 24 I1l.2d 520, 532-33, 182 N.E.2d 169,
176 (1962).
3 s Id. at 532-33, 182 N.E.2d at 176; United Fuel Gas Co. v. Allen, 137 W.Va. 897,
902, 75 S.E.2d 88, 91 (1953).
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at the highest and best use to which it is
adapted.39
Thus, the enormous value of storage rights to the condemnor is irrelevant
to the amount of compensation which will be awarded. 40 Moreover, in
determining market value, the court will not consider that the landowner
might have used the same stratum to store gas himself, since such use is
too speculative.41
The burden is upon the defendant landowner to prove the value of the
property taken and damage caused to the residue.42 Also, the condemnor
may introduce evidence of prices which it has paid for similar interests
in voluntary transactions with other landowners.4 3 As a result, awards
have been diminutive in the overwhelming number of reported cases of
condemnation of storage rights. 44 In cases where the jury has awarded larger
judgments, the courts have demonstrated a willingness to overturn these
awards as excessive. 4 5
C. Persistence of Ownership and Trespass Questions
There are several reasons why the possibility of acquiring storage
rights, through voluntary or involuntary techniques, has not eliminated
the legal problems of ownership and trespass of injected gas:
(1) Many condemnation statutes require that gas companies through
39 Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Buckles, 24 Ill.2d 520, 531-32, 182 N.E.2d 169,
176 (1962).
40 Milby v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 375 S.W.2d 237 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963).
41 As the Buckles court demonstrated, there is little likelihood that the landowner
can combine his land with other properties overlying the reservoir, a prerequisite
for using his own land for storage purposes. Indeed, the prior acquisition of
rights in the storage field by another may make it impossible for the landowner
to acquire a storage permit in those states where it is required, 24 Ill.2d at 538,
182 N.E.2d at 179. Even in those states which do not require such a pzrmit, if
the storage operator has already injected gas into the reservoir, the landowner will
risk losing title to any gas he then injects into the reservoir under the "confusion
of goods doctrine." See Note 65 infra.4 2 United Fuel Gas Co. v. Allen, 137 W. Va. 897, 902, 75 S.E.2d 88, 91 (1953).
431d. at 911, 75 S.E.2d at 96; Milby v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 375 S.W.2d
237, 240 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963).
44 In two Kentucky cases, the ultimate award for storage rights amounted to fifty
cents per acre per year. Milby v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 375 S.W.2d 237
(Ky. Ct. App. 1963); Cornwell v. Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 249 S.W.2d 531
(Ky. Ct. App. 1952). In Midwestern Gas Transmission Co. v. Mason, 31 1ll.2d
340, 201 N.E.2d 379 (1964), nothing was awarded for condemnation of a
stratum underlying 107 acres of land. $13.60 per acre for storage rights over a
twenty year period was awarded in United Fuel Gas Co. v. Allen, 137 W.Va. 897,
75 S.E.2d 88, 91 (1953). And in the Buckles case, an award of only $25 per
acre for storage rights in fee was made.
45Milby v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 375 S.W.2d 237 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963);
United Fuel Gas Co. v. Allen, 137 W.Va. 897, 75 S.E.2d 88 (1953).
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voluntary agreements acquire storage rights in a certain percentage of the
reservoir property before condemnation will be permitted. Thus, in both
Pennsylvania and Michigan, the two largest gas storage states, 46 interests
in seventy-five percent of the necessary area must first be voluntarily
acquired. 4 7 When gas companies confront obstinate landowners unwilling
to grant storage rights, or willing to grant them only for exorbitant fees,
the gas companies will be unable to acquire the storage rights unless they
pay the price or have the percentage of interests demanded by statute. If
alternative facilities are not available, the economic pressures would seem
to dictate that the companies go ahead with storage operations anyway. A
failure to do so would disrupt development schedules and deprive the
companies of the tremendous savings to be derived from storage opera-
tions. 48 Moreover, the possibility of legal sanctions for proceeding to store
the gas without acquiring sufficient property interests may not represent
a significant deterrent to the gas company. 49
(2) Gas may be injected during negotiations for the voluntary acqui-
sition of storage rights. These negotiations ordinarily precede condemnation
actions, frequently as required by law. 50 Of course, if the provisions of
the applicable eminent domain statute are met, the storage operator may
condemn the land as soon as the landowner threatens to appropriate the
gas or sues for a trespass. But this will not preclude the ownership and
trespass questions from arising. It is incumbent upon the court hearing the
condemnation suit to decide if ownership remains in the injector in order
to determine the proper amount of compensation. The condemnation pro-
ceeding, moreover, has no bearing upon the question of the condemnor's
liability for a previous trespass.5 1
(3) The gas company may mistakenly fail to acquire rights from a
party whose property interest will be affected by the storage project. The
gas company may, for example, fail to discover a mineral lease or royalty
deed in its title search.5 2 As a rule, any eminent domain suit which it
46 Between them, the two states contain about one-third of the nation's gas storage.
THE UNDERGROUND STORAGE OF GAS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA,
supra note 10 at 7.4 7 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 486.252 (1948); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 2401 (1966).
Percentage requirements in other states include: Ohio - 65%, OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4161.17 (Page 1964); Indiana-60%, IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1732 (Supp.
1966); New Mexico-75%, N. M. STAT. ANN. § 65-9-4 (Supp. 1967); New
York-75%, N.Y. CONSERV. H§ 85, 86 (McKinney 1967); Washington-
65%, Ch. 201 § 5, 1963 WASH. SESSION LAWS 1005.
48 See notes 100-105 and accompanying text infra.
49 See text accompanying notes 58-66 infra.
50 E.g., Ky. REV. STAT. § 278.502 (Supp. 1966); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 65-9-3 (Supp.
1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 2401 (1966); ch. 201 § 4, 1963 WASH. SESSION
LAWS 1003.
51 4 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 14.24 (3rd rev. ed. 1965).
52 In 1958, for example, in acquiring storage rights for a field in Mecosta County,
Michigan, the Michigan Consolidated Gas Company failed to notice a mineral
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had previously brought to appropriate the land may then be ineffective
as to this interest. 53 In some jurisdictions, if the gas company is unable
to determine who owns interests in the property, the property may still
be condemned by paying the award into court. 54
(4) There may be an unforeseen leakage of gas from the reservior.
However, such cases appear to be rare. When gas is stored in totally or
partially depleted oil or gas reserviors, the same geological factors which
permitted the native oil or gas to accumulate within the reservoir rock
are operative to restrain the injected gas within the same area. 55 While
no rock is absolutely impermeable, 56 rock surrounding reserviors chosen
for storage projects should be sufficiently impermeable to prevent losses
of gas in commercial quantities.5 7
(5) Lastly, gas companies may not always bother to lease, purchase,
or condemn storage rights. In certain situations they may never have to
pay anything for subterranean strata if they do not voluntarily take steps
which will result in compensation to landowners. While in practice gas
companies ordinarily do acquire gas storage rights, the common assertion
by spokesmen for the untilities and by legal writers that they must do
so to avoid the risk of losing the gas or being sued for trespassSS has
never been adequately documented. This assumption, in fact, has rested
on a legal analysis divorced from practical, and especially economic,
considerations.
In many cases, the landowner undoubtedly will remain unaware that
gas is being stored under his land unless the gas company informs him.
lease acquired by the Sun Oil Company in 440 acres of the reservoir. Subse-
quently, Sun Oil Company assigned its interest in the lease to the Smith Petro-
leum Company, which applied for a well permit from the Michigan Conservation
Commission. This application brought the mineral interest to the attention of
Michigan Consolidated, which then successfully condemned the interest. Inter-
view with Charles Maxwell, Supervisor of the Gas Section, Michigan Public
Service Commission, in Lansing, Michigan, February 16, 1968.
53 It has been held that condemnation proceedings
pass nothing more than the title to whatever
interests were possessed by persons who were
made parties to the proceeding. A party who
could not be notified is not bound by the award
or judgment. 3 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF
EMINENT DOMAIN § 9.1(2) (3rd rev. ed. 1965).54 See 3 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § § 9.1(1), Id. Vol. 4 at §
12.36 (3rd rev. ed. 1965).
55 Interview with Professor Landes, supra note 14.
56 A. LEVORSEN, GEOLOGY OF PETROLEUM 104 (2d ed. 1967).
57 Interview with Professor Landes, supra note 14.
58 Interview with Herman Fruechtenicht, Director of Gas Procurement & Develop-
ment Department, Consumers Power Company, in Jackson, Michigan, February
23, 1968; Interview with Joseph Hancock and Charles McDugald, supra note
16; Scott, Underground Storage of Natural Gas: A Study of Legal Problems,
19 OKLA. L. REV. 47, 56 (1966); Comment, Condemnation of Depleted Under-
ground Reservoirs for Gas Storage Areas, 15 OHIO ST. L. J. 199 (1954).
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While gas companies, according to the laws of many storage states, are
under a duty to file maps of their storage reservoirs with state conservation
commissions, these reports are not automatically made available to all
landowners whose rights may be affected.5 9 Storage reservoirs are large
enough that the landowner may not guess that wells some distance away
may in fact be pumping gas under his land.60
Even if the landowner discovers that gas lies under his land, the storage
operator may still be in an excellent position to avoid payment. In some
cases, the landowner may lack the funds to initiate court action against
the gas company. If he can afford a suit, he may still lack the resources
to make an effective case. A good example of this dilemma is the case of
Whetstone v. Michigan Consolidated Gas C0.61 Plaintiff learned of maps
filed with the Michigan Conservation Commission indicating that a stratum
under her land was being used by the gas company for storage purposes.
Without the aid of an attorney, she filed suit in the federal court for the
Eastern District of Michigan, but her complaint was dismissed with prej-
udice on a procedural point. Still without an attorney, she appealed to
the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals which overruled the
dismissal. Upon remand, plaintiff lost on the merits when the gas company
produced two of its own employees, a geologist and a chemical engineer,
who testified that no gas was being stored under her land. Plaintiff could
not afford her own expert witnesses to counter this testimony. Thus, the
court held that she had not sustained her burden of proving a trespass,
notwithstanding the seemingly more objective evidence in the form of
maps which had been filed by the defendant for many years with a state
agency and which supported the plaintiff's position.
Regardless of the merits of th~s particular litigation, the case does demon-
strate the tremendous difficulty of proving a case of trespass against the
storage operator. In many cases of this sort, the plaintiff can sustain his
burden of proof only by drilling a well under his land. 62 He may lack
59E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4161.02 (Page 1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52,
§ 2301 (1966); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 22-7-2 (1966). The West Virginia and
Pennsylvania statutes only require such filing when there is a possibility that
the gas storage will interfere with coal mining operations.
60 Injection operations in the Menifee Gas Storage Field, for example, expanded that
field from an area of some 18,000 acres to one approaching 40,000 acres.
Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co. v. Smallwood, 252 S.W.2d 866 (Ky. 1952).
1 I am indebted for an account of this case to Fred Fox and especially to Walter
Nelson. Interview with Fred Fox and Walter Nelson, members of the Michigan
Bar, in Detroit, January 26, 1968. The original dismissal of the suit is un-
reported. The report for decision on appeal from this dismissal is 289 F.2d
494 (6th Cir. 1961). Upon remand, a determination of an issue irrelevant
to this discussion was reported: 219 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. Mich. 1963). The
district court's separate opinion on issues germane to this discussion was un-
reported but was available in the clerk's office of the court. Mem., Whetstone
v. Michigan Consolidated Gas Co. (E.D. Mich. Feb. 17, 1965).
62 Interview with Herman Fruechtenicht, supra note 58.
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sufficient resources for such a project, 63 and the cost of the well is un-
likely to be shifted to the gas company while determination of the suit
on the merits is pending. 6 4
Similarly, it may be extremely difficult for the mineral owner to prove
that any native oil or gas was appropriated when storage operations were
commenced. Thus, what might otherwise have been the most effective de-
terrent to a practice of not acquiring storage rights- the possibility that
the injector might lose title to his gas if it commingled with native gas and
became unidentifiable65- may be of no consequence.
In jurisdictions which hold that the injector loses title to gas injected
into the ground for storage or in which this question has not been re-
solved, it may be surmised that storage operators will be deterred from
deliberately omitting to acquire storage rights by the possibility that land-
owners may drill a well and acquire ownership to the injected gas by
withdrawing it from the ground for their own purposes. But in practice,
this threat may not be significant to the gas company. Even if landowners
are aware of the gas being stored under their land, they are unlikely to
have adequate resources to undertake production of that gas. 6 6 Moreover,
state conservation laws may be applied to limit gas production severely
when such production interferes with storage projects. This possibility
is likely to deter substantial investment by mineral developers in such
operations.
There is some question concerning the extent to which gas companies
deliberately undertake storage operations without compensating all affected
landowners. Spokesmen for the utilities tend to insist that such a practice
is, to their knowledge, non-existent. 6 7 At least one knowledgable attorney,
on the other hand, is certain that gas companies do, in particular situations,
deliberately choose not to acquire storage rights. 68 The latter position would
appear to be supported by the cases, to the extent that they reflect at all upon
this question. In the unreported case of Whetstone v. Michigan Consolidated
Gas Co.,69 for example, Michigan Consolidated's own maps, which had been
filed with the Michigan Conservation Commission for several years, indi-
63 For a well 1,300 feet deep, the minimum cost would be about $15,000. Interview
with Charles Maxwell, supra note 52. It has been estimated that drilling a well
generally may cost between $25,000 and $500,000. 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS,
supra note 7, § 103.
64 Interview with Charles Maxwell, supra note 52.
65 See 1 E. KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 2.6 (rev. of
THORNTON ON OIL AND GAS 1962).66 Hunt v. State, 48 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1932); Interview with
Walter Nelson, member of the Michigan Bar, in Detroit, January 26, 1968.
67 Interview with Herman Fruechtenicht, supra note 58; Interview with J. A.
Domagalski, Manager of the Land & Legal Services Department, Michigan
Consolidated Gas Company, in Detroit, Michigan, March 7, 1968; interview with
Joseph Hancock and Charles McDugald, supra note 16.
68 Interview with Walter Nelson, supra note 66.
69 See note 61 supra.
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cated that plaintiff's subsurface was being used for gas storage by the com-
pany, or its lessee, but no attempt was made to compensate the plaintiff.
When plaintiff sued, the utility fought the case and won. Although none of
the reported cases explain why sufficient storage rights were not obtained
by the gas company, it is at least clear in some of these cases that the storage
operator could not have been unaware that its gas was in lands in which no
property interests had been acquired. 7 0
At any rate, there is a substantial possibility that gas companies will
turn to a policy of storing gas without acquiring all the "necessary" storage
rights, particularly in jurisdictions which do not permit condemnation of
storage rights, or permit it only after a high percentage of those rights
have been voluntarily acquired. One executive of a major gas company
indicated that his company would proceed with storage operations if a
situation arose where necessary storage rights in a vitally and immediately
needed reservoir could not be acquired through voluntary agreements or
condemnation. The utility would, however, continue to pursue settlements
with owners of outstanding property interests. Determinations to proceed
in this manner would depend upon the economic pressures for commencing
storage operations and upon the risks incurred thereby by the company. This
same executive also speculated that in states without multiple storage
possibilities, and with either no condemnation statute or with a statute with
high percentage requirements, storage operators might be led to store
gas without ever voluntarily compensating landowners for storage rights.7 1
IlI. Problem of Ownership
Judicial consideration of the problem of maintaining one's rights to
gas injected for storage has been limited to a few reported cases applying
the laws of Kentucky, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Texas. The central
question in each case has been whether or not the rule of capture,72 which,
subject to certain legislative and administrative restrictions, is the universal
rule in this country in regard to native gas, should be extended to gas which
has already been taken out of the ground but which is reinjected for storage.
A. The Hammonds Doctrine
One line of cases in Kentucky has extended the rule of capture to gas
injected for storage with little consideration of the propriety of such ex-
70 Hammonds v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 255 Ky. 685, 75 S.W.2d 204
(1934); Iroquois Gas Corp. v. Gernatt, 50 Misc.2d 1028, 272 N.Y.S.2d 291
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966), af'd, 28 A.D.2d 811, 281 N.Y.S.2d 896 (1967).
71 Interview with J. A. Domagalski, supra note 67.
72The rule of capture amounts to a legal recognition that whoever takes gas out of
the ground, thereby reducing it to possession, owns it, even if it has migrated
from the land of another. 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 7, § 204.4;
Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 581, 210 S.W.2d 558, 561-62, (1948).
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tension. This treatment of the problem has rested largely on a conception
of gas, whether native or injected, as a wandering and fugacious mineral:
Under the analogy to animals ferae
naturae it is apparent that there is no dis-
tinction in the title to gas once recovered
and released for subterranean storage and
native gas before its initial recovery.
Title to gas in place is a qualified one.
Because of its fugitive characteristics, one
does not own the gas in the sense that one
owns the surface or the solid minerals.
Such ownership is limited to the exclusive
right to explore, and if gas should be
found to reduce the same to possession
and ownership. 73
The best known of these cases is Hammonds v. Central Kentucky
Natural Gas Co.,74 the first case in which a state court of last resort
ruled on the immediate title and trespass questions for stored gas found
under another's land. In Hammonds, the plaintiff sued the defendant gas
company for trespass after the defendant injected gas into a depleted nat-
ural reservoir, part of which underlay the plaintiff's land. Relying upon
the analogies of percolating waters and of captured wild animals which
become ferae naturae upon escape from their captor, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals held that there could be no trespass because the injector
had lost title to the gas upon injection. Thus, while the plaintiff could not
recover for a trespass, he could seemingly drill a well under his land and
help himself to any gas which he found there.
There is little doubt that the Hammonds case remains the law in Ken-
tucky. The case was explicitly followed in Central Kentucky Natural Gas
Co. v. Smallwood.7 5 It has been suggested that the subsequent case of
Smallwood v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas C0.76 represented an "ero-
sion" of the Hammonds doctrine in Kentucky in that the case failed to
treat stored gas as a mineral ferae naturae.77 This assertion is unwarranted.
The case was one of contractual interpretation and explicitly distinguished
the Hammonds case and the previous Smallwood case. In a later condem-
nation case,7 S the same court acknowledged that gas which had migrated
73 Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co. v. Smallwood, 252 S.W.2d 866, 867-868 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1952).
74 255 Ky. 685, 75 S.W.2d 204 (1934).
75 252 S.W.2d 866 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952).
76 308 S.W.2d 439 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957).
77 Scott, Underground Storage of Natural Gas: A Study of Legal Problems, 19 OKLA.
L. REV. 47, 52 (1966).
78 Milby v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 375 S.W.2d 237 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963).
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into the defendants' land might be recovered as their personal property
under the authority of the Hammonds case.
Similarly, in Oklahoma, though there has been no determination of this
precise question, the authorities make it clear that the Hammonds rule will
be followed. In West Edmond Salt Water Disposal Ass'n. v. Rosecrans,79
the court applied the Hammonds rule to injected salt water which mi-
grated under the plaintiff's land. While the situation is readily distin-
guishable from the case of migrated storage gas, in that the injector intended
to abandon the salt water, and the public interest in economic development
was vindicated by a finding of loss of title, the Rosecrans court indicated that
the result would have been the same if oil or gas, rather than salt water, had
been involved.
Although Bezzi v. Hocker,8O a federal case applying Oklahoma law,
concerned the distinct problem of rights of a lessor and lessee inter se re-
garding gas injected for conservation purposes, the court did indicate that
injected gas would be subject to the rule of capture under the Rosecrans
holding:
While the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
was not presented with the precise ques-
tion here, it did liken salt water to oil,
gas, and other fugacious minerals which
are subject to the law of capture.S1
Without considering any possible distinctions between native gas and in-
jected gas or between the equities, both public and private, bearing upon
salt water and gas, the court reasoned:
It is now recognized that oil and gas are
mobile and fugacious, and if it [sic] es-
capes [sic] to other lands or comes [sic]
under another's control, whatever title the
original owner had is lost. It belongs to
the person who legally obtains control and
possession of it.82
In Bingaman v. Corporation Commission,8 3 the court affirmed an order
of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission approving a plan of unitization
whereby royalty owners were to be denied royalties for the reproduction of gas
injected by the lessee as part of a recycling, or secondary recovery, opera-
tion. Retention of title to injected gas would seem implicit in such result.
79 204 Okla. 9, 226 P.2d 965 (1950).
sO 370 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1966).
sl Id. at 536.
s2 Id. at 535.
S3 421 P.2d 635 (Okla. 1966).
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Bingaman, however, is readily distinguishable from the problem at hand
on several grounds: (1) rights between lessor and lessee were in issue;
(2) the primary source for determining such rights was the terms of a
royalty agreement which exempted such reproduction from royalty pay-
ments; and (3) the rule of capture was limited by order of the Corpora-
tion Commission under its police power.8 4
B. Legislative Treatments
The majority of statutes which have touched upon the question of own-
ership of injected gas appear to incorporate the Hammonds holding. Okla-
homa legislation, for example, protects the property rights of the injector
to the gas,
• . . provided that the injector, his heirs,
successors, and assigns, shall have no right
to gas in any stratum, or portion thereof,
which has not been condemned under the
provisions of this Act, or otherwise pur-
chased. [Emphasis added].85
As suggested by other writers discussing the statute,8 6 such language rep-
resents a positive determination that title to the injected gas is lost unless
the land under which the gas is stored has been previously condemned
or purchased by the storage operator. The Arkansas,8 7 Louisiana,88
Nebraska,8 9 and New Mexico 9O statutes are virtually identical to that of
Oklahoma.
The Missouri legislation, on the other hand, does not appear to re-
solve the problem of ownership of gas which has migrated into unacquired
84 For an excellent discussion of these points and an analysis of the Bingaman case,
see Note, Oil and Gas: Royalties on Injected Gas, 21 OKLA. L. REV. 215 (1968).
s5 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 36.6 (Supp. 1967).
86 Stamm, Legal Problems in the Underground Storage of Natural Gas, 36 TEX. L.
REV. 161, 178 (1957). To the same effect is the following language in Scott,
supra note 77, at 70:
In effect the statute has added nothing to exist-
ing case law on the subject. It provides that
if the proponent has the necessary land con-
demned, then the gas contained therein is his
and no one else may produce it. However, if
the gas migrates to land which is not con-
demned, then the injector loses his exclusive
right to recover this gas. This is the same cir-
cumstance which occasioned the Hammonds
decision.
87 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 53-907 (Supp. 1967).
88 LA. REV. STAT. § 30:22 (Supp. 1966).
89 NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-608 (Supp. 1965).
90 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 65-9-8 (Supp. 1967).
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strata. It provides that injected gas, unless abandoned, will remain the per-
sonal property of the injector and may not be reduced to possession by
the owner of land under which the gas company has acquired a right to
store gas,
• . . provided nothing herein contained
shall apply to a person under whose land
gas may be stored without the gas storage
company having obtained the right to
store gas. 9 1
The Colorado legislative formulation appears to be contrary to the
Hammonds rule. Its language may be interpreted to mean that the injector
retains ownership of the gas even when the gas migrates into lands in
which the injector has no storage rights:
All natural gas in said underground
reservoir and the rights reasonably neces-
sary for the injection and storage in and
withdrawal from said underground reser-
voir of said natural gas, as defined and
limited by the decree of the district court,
shall be the property of said natural gas
public utility. In no event shall such gas
be subject to the right of the owner of the
surface of said lands or of any mineral in-
terest therein or of any person other than
the public utility ... to produce, take, re-
duce to possession or otherwise interfere
with or exercise any control thereover.
[Emphasis added].92
Enactments of three other states are similar to the Colorado statute in that
they contain no express qualifications on their protection of ownership of
gas injected for storage. 9 3
91 Mo. REV. STAT. § 393.500 (Supp. 1966).
92 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 100-9-3 (1963).
93 GA. CODE ANN. § 93-811 (Supp. 1967); N.Y. CONSERV. § 88 (McKinney 1967);
ch. 201, § 6, 1963 WASH. SESSION LAWS 1005-06.
The New York Statute adds the following provisions:
... the injector . . . shall have no right to
reserves of native gas or oil remaining in any
stratum or portion thereof which have not been
condemned hereunder or otherwise acquired by
such injector . . . . N.Y. CONSERV. § 88 (Mc-
Kinney 1967).
It is submitted that this provision should be distinguished from the Oklahoma
statute and its progeny. The critical distinction in the New York statute is
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Unfortunately, none of these recent statutes which touch upon the own-
ership of migrated storage gas has. been construed by any case law.
Therefore, it is not certain that the courts will read these differences in
language to demand different results. In addition, it is not entirely clear
whether these statutes apply at all unless storage rights have been con-
demned at least in the particular piece of land into which the gas has been
injected, since these provisions are all found within acts providing for the
condemnation of storage rights. 9 4
C. Economic Objections to the Hammonds Doctrine
The most fundamental objections to the application of the rule of cap-
ture to produced gas injected for storage are economic ones. By the time
gas is injected into a natural reservoir for storage, substantial investments
have already been made by the gas company to prepare it not only for
transmission through the pipelines, but also for ultimate consumption.
There are, in fact, four common types of gas treatment prior to injection:
gasoline plant processing, dehydration, the removal of chemical impurities,
and the removal of physical impurities. 95 In view of these expensive proc-
esses, :96 it is anomalous to hold that the gas company loses title upon
injection.
Probably the most serious economic shortcoming of the Hammonds rule
is the effect which it may have upon retail gas prices, and thus upon the
residential consumer of gas. Unless alternative means of protecting own-
ership of the gas would be entirely practical and efficient, 9 7 it is clear that
underground storage of gas might be effectively precluded under the Ham-
between native oil or gas remaining in a depleted reservoir which had never
been owned by the storage operator and gas previously reduced to possession
by the storage operator and then injected for storage. The injector is given no
property rights to native oil or gas in unacquired strata. Under the New York
statute, however, it appears that title to any gas injected for storage remains in
the injector, even if it migrates into land in which no storage rights have been
obtained. This is unlike the Oklahoma statute where a distinction is apparently
made between injected gas lying in lands in which storage rights have been
obtained and that in lands in which they have not.
91 In Colorado, for example, §§ 100-9-3 to 100-9-7 of COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. (1963)
provide for the condemnation of storage rights. Language within § 100-9-7
(which protects the property rights of the gas company in the stored gas)
specifically refers back to the eminent domain proceeding brought under
§ 100-9-3.
95 Jacobs, From Field to Market, in THE DYNAMIC NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY 70-73
(1962).
96 The facilities used in gasoline plant processing, for example, "represent investments
of about $30 to $40 per gallon per day of products recovered." Id. at 70.
97 Alternative means might include (1) limitation of gas storage in sufficiently
sealed underground rock formations well within property boundaries; (2) the
purchase, leasing, or condemnation of sufficient property interests; and (3) the
effective prohibition of capture of another's storage gas through state admin-
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monds rule because the injector of gas would in essense be abandoning
it to the first taker.
As underground storage is critical to the gas industry, its availability or
nonavailability has an important bearing upon the price paid for gas by
individual consumers. Gas companies, as public utilities, are subject to
rate regulations by municipalities, the federal government, and the states,98
and rates are determined according to cost of service formulae in which
the costs of transportation and storage play a vital part.99 Without ques-
tion, the absence of gas storage would result in higher transmission costs
which would ultimately be borne by the residential gas consumer.
It is perhaps easiest to appreciate the relationship of storage facilities
to gas prices by considering how prices would be affected if companies
had to use pipelines capable of carrying enough gas to meet the greatest
consumer demand at any particular time. According to Raymond W. Todd,
at the time chairman of the American Gas Association's Subcommittee on
Underground Storage Statistics, if such pipelines were used in southern
California, their average use would be about 33% of capacity.
Gas delivered in southern California mar-
kets now costs about 38c per MCF
[1,000 cubic feet] at 100% load factor.
Fixed costs represent almost 50% or
about 18c per MCF. If the load factor
were 33% the fixed costs would be
around 54c per MCF put through the
pipelines. When other costs are added,
one MCF would cost about 74c - a size-
able change from 38c.1 00
Of course, these figures to some extent exaggerate the effect of gas storage
on the price structure. The assumption that in the absence of underground
gas storage, pipelines large enough to meet maximum demand would have
to be built, ignores other techniques such as interruptable servicel01 and
istrative regulations. None of these alternatives, whether taken separately or
cumulatively, are likely to be both entirely effective and efficient in protecting
ownership of the gas.
9s Leeston, From Public Utilities to Private Homes, in THE DYNAMIC NATURAL GAS
INDUSTRY 179 (1962).
99 In 1966, for example, transmission costs (exclusive of any distribution costs),
which are critically affected by the accessibility of gas storage facilities, repre-
sented 8.8% of the operating expenses for natural gas transmission companies.
GAS FACTS, supra note I, at 208-09. These costs in turn became part of the
gas purchasing costs for gas distributing utilities. At the same time, storage costs
for the year amounted to only 0.8% of operating expenses for all natural gas
companies. Id.
100 Todd, supra note 3, at 174.
101 See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
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off-peak service' 0 2 which would improve annual load factors. On the other
hand, seasonal fluctuations in demand are undoubtedly even greater in
parts of the country with colder winters than those of southern California,
so in these places costs would rise even more radically with the construc-
tion of larger pipelines to meet greater demands for gas. Except in cases
where interruptable service can be provided on a large scale, therefore,
the statistics appear to present a relatively meaningful yardstick for meas-
uring the relationship of gas storage to gas prices.
Some idea as to the magnitude of storage costs may be derived from a
study of statistics of the Michigan Gas Storage Company, a subsidiary of
Consumers Power Company in Jackson, Michigan, whose sole function is
to store gas. In 1966, the company's net purchases of gas averaged 30.00
cents per MCF.103 Its average revenue per MCF sold, on the other hand,
was 39.46 cents. 10 4 This difference of 9.46 cents included total operating
expenses for the company, including all administrative costs, as well as
depreciation of equipment, amortization of investments, and a six percent
return to, the company on its total investment. It is likely that actual gas
storage costs represented a small fraction of this figure. 10 5
The cost of gas has become personally relevant to more and more peo-
ple with the enormous growth of the gas industry. In 1966, for example,
the number of residential gas consumers rose to 35,141,800, compared to
only 27,241,000 in 1956.106 Of the 1966 residential gas consumers,
seventy-seven percent, or some 27.1 million, heated their homes with
gas.1 07 Also, it has been estimated that by the end of 1966, almost fifty-
two percent, or 30.5 million, of the housing units in the United States
were heated with gas. 10s Consequently, any interference with underground
gas storage would be directly felt by a large segment of the population.
And it is important to note that the popularization of gas has been at least
partially facilitated by its remarkably stable price over the last seven
years.1 09
102 "Off-peak service" has been defined as:
Service made available on special schedules or
contracts on a firm basis but only for a specified
part of the year during the off-peak season.
GAS FACTS, supra note 1, at 247.
103 ANNUAL REPORT OF MICHIGAN GAS STORAGE COMPANY TO THE FEDERAL POWER
COMMISSION 535 (1967).
104 Id. at 521.
105 See note 6 supra.
106 GAS FACTS, supra note 1, at 79.
107 Id. at 1, 139.
108 Id. at 139.
109 During 1966, residential consumers paid an average of 10.0 cents per therm of
gas, the same rate which they paid in 1961. Id. at 112.
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D. Judicial Rejection of the Hammonds Doctrine
Cases in some jurisdictions have either expressly refuted the Hammonds
case or at least revealed bases for avoiding its holding. In Michigan, there
has been no reported case explicitly treating the question of ownership
of injected gas. The Michigan Supreme Court, however, implicitly re-
jected the Hammonds rationale in Michigan Consolidated Gas Co. v.
Austin Township,110 where it held that gas in natural storage reservoirs
could be taxed as personal property of the storage operator. In that case,
plaintiff sued the defendant townships for the recovery of ad valorem per-
sonal property taxes assessed on gas stored in the townships by the plain-
tiff and paid by the plaintiff under protest. In affirming a lower court
judgment for the defendants, the Supreme Court of Michigan focused on
the issue of whether this constituted state taxation of interstate commerce.
It is unlikely that Michigan Consolidated Gas Company tried to avoid pay-
ment of the tax by arguing that the gas was not its personal property, for
this would have implied that title had been lost by injection and might be
an unfavorable precedent in a situation like Hammonds. Thus, the court
may not have been benefited by an adversary confrontation on this issue.
Even so, in the face of the language and result in the Austin Township
case, it is not easy to imagine any Michigan court holding that title to
injected gas is lost:
While the physical properties of gas are
admittedly different . . . from those of
coal, grain, and oil, gas is personal prop-
erty which can be stored, processed and
sold. 111
It is therefore probable that Michigan will not follow the Hammonds
decision.
The Hammonds solution to the question of ownership of gas which has
been injected for storage and has migrated into another's property has
been explicitly rejected in two subsequent cases applying Pennsylvania and
Texas law, respectively: White v. New York State Natural Gas Corp.112
and Lone Star Gas Co. v. Murchison.11 3
The White case is significant in that Pennsylvana law was involved.
It was an early Pennsylvania case, Westmoreland & Cambria Gas Co. v.
DeWitt,' 14 that first applied the doctrine of animals ferae naturae to oil
and gas law. Moreover, the doctrine as applied to injected gas had been
given implicit approval by a state district court in Protz v. Peoples Natural
110 373 Mich. 123, 128 N.W.2d 491 (1964).
111 Id. at 142, 128 N.W.2d at 501.
112 190 F. Supp. 342 (W.D. Pa. 1960).
113 353 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1962).
114 130 Pa. 235, 18 A. 724 (1889).
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Gas Co.115 The White court cited both cases but refused to be bound by
either.
Although the district court in White explicitly declined to extend the
ferae naturae concept beyond the original capture of native oil and gas, its
primary bases for decision lay entirely within the framework of that an-
alogy.l 1 6 In effect, the court used doctrines which were part and parcel
of the law relating to captured and escaped Wild animals to avoid the
result reached in the Hammonds case.
The court stated that the injected gas remained subject to the control
of the injector within a well-defined storage field and had therefore not
escaped from its owner. 1 7 Thus, under the ferae naturae analogy the in-
jector had not lost title to the gas. The test for an escape under the law
regarding wild animals hinges upon whether the animal remains subject
to artificial restraints or the injector's control.11S In the overwhelming
number of cases where gas migrates under another's land, it is likely that
gas will in fact remain subject to the injector's control. It is a truism that
gas companies would not inject gas for storage unless it appeared certain
that they could subsequently withdraw it. Gas companies can generally
enlarge and shrink storage reservoirs at will.11 9 Careful testing and prepa-
rations which must precede every gas storage project for the most part
preclude serious losses of storage gas.
The White court presented another basis for its decision:
Moreover, there has been no return of
storage gas to its "natural habitat", since
Southwest gas, differing materially in
chemical and physical properties from na-
tive Oriskany gas, is not native to the Or-
iskany Sands underlying the Hebron-Ellis-
burg Field.120
Although this factor appears irrelevant to the question of escape under the
animals Ierae naturae analogy,1 2 1 it may be significant by analogy to the
legal proposition that where the subsequent captor of an escaped animal
is on notice as to the ownership of the animal, title may remain in the
115 93 Pitts. L.J. 239, aft'd, 94 Pitts. L.J. 139 (1945).
116 The court also made a brief, but significant and proper, allusion to state public
policy supporting underground gas storage, as manifested in state legislation
granting eminent domain power for this purpose. 190 F. Supp. at 349.
117 190 F. Supp. at 348.
118 Mullett v. Bradley, 24 Misc. 695, 696-97, 53 N.Y.S. 781, 782-83 (N.Y. App. T.
1898).
119 Interview with Professor Katz, supra note 8.
120 190 F. Supp. at 348.
121 In Mullett v. Bradley, 24 Misc. 695, 53 N.Y.S. 781 (N.Y. App. T. 1898), for
example, the court held that the escape of plaintiff's sea lion into a strange
environment did not mean that it had not attained its natural liberty.
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original captor.122 Injected gas which has been transmitted over pipe-
lines from great distances frequently differs in properties from gas native
to the locality of storage. These differences are detectable.1 23 In this sense,
surrounding land owners who begin to withdraw the gas may very well be
on notice as to its ownership. In addition, some landowners may be on
notice as to the ownership of the gas to the extent that they are aware of
gas storage operations being conducted in their area.
As will be demonstrated, the animals ferae naturae analogy should be
completely abandoned in gas storage cases. It is nevertheless clear that if
such analogy is to be followed, its proper application would not subject
injected gas to the rule of capture.
In Lone Star Gas Co. v. Murchison12 4 the gas company sued defendant
for conversion of the natural gas which it had produced and injected into
a natural subsurface reservoir for storage purposes. The court held that
the plaintiff had not lost title to the gas and reversed the trial court's
judgment for the defendant.
The Texas court in Murchison came directly to grips with the propriety
of the analogy of injected gas to animals ferae naturae and concluded:
[I]n the light of advanced knowledge and
scientific achievement in the oil and gas
industry, we are of the opinion that the
rule of the Hammonds case should not be
embraced as the law in Texas .... Gas has
no similarity to wild animals. Gas is an
inanimate, diminishing non-reproductive
substance lacking any will of its own, and,
instead of running wild and roaming at
large as animals do, is subject to be moved
solely by pressure or mechanical means.125
Clearly, this represents a more fundamental quarrel with the Hammonds
case than that presented by the White case. As suggested by Murchison,
there is little practical or factual justification for analogizing oil and gas to
wild animals.
The Murchison court properly demonstrated a willingness to treat the
question of ownership of injected gas as an entirely distinct problem from
that of native gas. The rule of capture was in fact a rough but workable
legal technique for delineating property rights in a mineral which migrated
122 In Stephens & Co. v. Albers, 81 Colo. 488, 256 P. 15. (1927), the absence of
wild foxes and the presence of large numbers of foxes in captivity in the area,
as well as a special brand or mark on the fox, was held to convey sufficient
notice to the captor to prevent a passage of title to the dead fox's pelt.
123 Interview with Professor Landes, supra note 14.
124 353 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1962).
125 Id. at 879.
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underground without regard to boundary lines. 126 Moreover, it has been
suggested that the courts at one time felt a special impetus to adopt the
rule of capture for oil and gas law, since it was believed that absolute
ownership of the gas by the landowner would render conservation statutes
invalid under the due process clause.' 2 7 The need for such justification is
no longer felt.1 28 Indeed, conservation considerations have led to ju-
dicial, 12 9 as well as legislative and administrative, 130 limitations on the rule
of capture. It would thus be anomalous to expand the application of the
rule to gas injected for storage.
Unlike native gas originally subject to capture, gas extracted from the
ground and subjected to possession is universally regarded as personal
property.131 As would therefore seem appropriate, the case law has held
that title to produced oil or gas which has escaped on the surface - al-
though it moves onto someone else's land -is not lost unless the gas or
oil has been abandoned by its owner.' 3 2 There is no demonstrable reason
why this same rule should not apply to injected gas which migrates un-
derground. Ownership of the injected gas has already been identified, so
there is no longer as difficult a problem of adjusting more than one land-
owner's interest in the gas as there may well be with native gas. More-
over, in most cases of subterranean migration there is perhaps even less
basis for finding an abandonment than in cases of escape along the surface,
since the gas remains subject to the control of the gas company in the
former case.1 33 Thus, the Murchison court appropriately demanded a
finding of abandonment before the injector could be held to have lost title
to the gas. The court alleged:
Contrary to the theory of abandonment
we find in this record a positive statement
of intention on the part of appellant to re-
claim its gas as it is needed to satisfy the
demand of consumers during times of
high fuel consumption.134
126 See Volz, The Oil and Gas Lease, in LECTURES ON OIL AND GAS LAW 1 (1954);
Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 581, 210 S.W.2d 558, 561, (1948).
127 48 HARV. L. REV. 855 (1935); 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 7, § 204.3.
12s 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 7, § 204.3.
129Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W.2d 558 (1948); Annot., 4
A.L.R.2d 198 (1949).
1302 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 10.5, 10.97 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); Volz,
The Oil and Gas Lease, in LECTURES ON OIL AND GAS LAW 3 (1954).
131 See i E. KUNTZ, supra note 65, § 2.5.
132 See Id.; Annot., 42 A.L.R. 577 (1926); 13 TEX. L. REV. 378 (1935).
13348 HARV. L. REV. 855, 856 (1935).
184 353 S.W.2d at 879.
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In other leading gas storage states, such as California, West Virginia,
Ohio, and Illinois,1 35 there are no reported cases on the problem of own-
ership of injected gas which has migrated into another's land. It would be
nearly impossible to predict the resolution of this issue in these jurisdic-
tions. The rule of capture as applied to native gas and the recognition of
produced gas as personal property are the most relevant legal principles
to the immediate problem. These doctrines are similarly treated in virtually
all the jurisdictions, including Kentucky and Oklahoma which follow the
Hammonds doctrine as well as Texas and Pennsylvania which reject it.136
Thus, it is clear that they do not explain how the courts will react to the
question of ownership of gas injected for storage. When ownership questions
arise as cases of first impression in the state courts, their treatment will
depend, on the one hand, upon the degree to which the jurisdiction is tied
to the animals Ierae naturae analogy and to a conception of gas as fu-
gacious and wandering or, on the other hand, upon its readiness to consider
the economic consequences of a finding of loss of title, and state public
policy, as reflected in eminent domain statutes for underground gas storage.
IV. The Problem of Trespass
If ownership of the migrated gas is found to remain in the storage oper-
ator, questions arise as to the possible liability of the storage operator for
trespass. 137 In the ordinary cases of migration of storage gas, either a tech-
nical trespass standard or a nuisance standard may be used to determine
whether a trespass has been committed. Under traditional notions of tres-
pass, a simple invasion or entry interfering with a plaintiff's exclusive pos-
session of his land and caused by defendant's act constituted a technical tres-
pass. There was no requirement of fault on defendant's part or harm to
plaintiff or his land.13 8 The nuisance standard, on the other hand, involves
balancing of harm to the plaintiff against benefit to the defendant and to
the public welfare. It is submitted that the technical trespass approach
should be followed because it will most expeditiously reconcile the conflict-
ing interests without excessive costs for storage operators.
135 These four states, when added to Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Oklahoma, con-
tained on December 31, 1966 more than 70% of the nation's gas being stored
underground, as may be seen from statistics in THE UNDERGROUND STORAGE OF
GAS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, supra note 10, at 7.
130 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 7, § 204.4.
137 Although the trespass issue was argued by the defendant in Lone Star v. Murchi-
son, 353 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1962), the court refused to consider
it, since the action had been brought by plaintiff for conversion of the gas.





According to Professors Keeton and Jones, the modern concept of tres-
pass to land demands: (I) a showing of harm caused by the entry or
invasion where such entry was not intentional and (2) a showing of some
degree of fault on the part of the defendant, whether it be negligence, in-
tention, or some degree or recklessness.1 39 Moreover, they argue that more
stringent requirements for finding a trespass would be particularly appro-
priate for subsurface invasions:
The mere fact that an actor is obtain-
ing a benefit from the subsurface use may
not be justification for a quasi-contractual
recovery, and if so a landowner's right
should be limited to a recovery for dam-
age caused and for the value of products
unjustifiably appropriated. Moreover, it
may be that a nuisance approach to all
such invasions, which necessarily involves
a balancing of interests, is the more de-
sirable one. 14 0
The advantages of such an approach are obvious. The owner of an ex-
hausted oil or gas stratum may have no use for it.141 A nuisance approach,
moreover, would mean substantial savings for the gas companies, because
storage rights would no longer have to be acquired in many situations,
unless the trespass would be likely to cause harm to the landowner.14 2
One difficulty with the nuisance approach which predicates recovery
upon a showing of harm is that migrated storage gas in the majority of
cases is bound to appropriate native gas or oil in the formation by inter-
mixing with it. Contrary to the common assumption in much legal litera-
139 Id. at 256.
140 Id. at 269-70.
141 Note, The Ownership of Natural Gas and Some Real Property Concepts, 36 VA.
L. REV. 947, 954-55 (1950).
142 "Harm" will be used in this discussion in the same sense that it is used in
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 165 (1965). Comment c states:
The harm may be an impairment of the phys-
ical condition of the land or an invasion occur-
ring on the land of some other legally protected
interest of the possessor, connected with his
interest of exclusive possession. These interests
include those in bodily security and freedom
from confinement, and in the possession and
physical condition of his chattels and the phys-
ical condition of the members of his family and
the servants belonging to his household. This
enumeration is not intended to be exclusive.
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ture that the stratum is exhausted and useless to the landowner, 14 3 the
stratum is ordinarily not completely depleted when storage is commenced.
Even if this oil or gas may not have been commercially recoverable, there
should be a remedy for its appropriation. It is of immense value to the gas
company, and it might ultimately have been recoverable by the land-
owner, or his assignee, with the development of better production tech-
niques.14 4
In any case, it seems unlikely that the application of the nuisance ap-
proach to subsurface trespasses will readily meet with widespread judicial
approval. The courts are less likely to be persuaded by arguments as to
the landowner's inability to use the stratum14 5 than by the fact that this
has been recognized as a property interest 14 6 of market value. 14 7
Similarly, under most of the modem authorities which are ready to
apply such a nuisance approach to subsurface trespasses, that approach is
abandoned when the invasion or entry is intentional. Thus, while Keeton
and Jones relied heavily upon Restatement of Torts § 165 (1934) which
143 E.g., Note, The Ownership of Natural Gas and Some Real Property Concepts,
36 VA. L. REV. 947, 954-55 (1950).
144 See Litz, supra note 5, at 153.
145 Such an argument is made in Note, The Ownership of Natural Gas and Some
Real Property Concepts, 36 VA. L. REV. 947, 955 (1950):
Nor should the land owner be permitted to
demand payment for the use of the stratum.
Whenever payment is given for the use of land
it is on the theory that the owner, if he used
it himself, would reap benefits of a commen-
surate value therefrom. But there is at present
no way that a private individual could make
use for his own benefit of an exhausted stratum
lying hundreds of feet beneath the surface.
146 The present state of the law is accurately presented in Scott, supra note 77, at
60-6 1:
• . . the surface owner's right to exclusive pos-
session extends downward beneath his land
usque ad inferos within the planes of his surface
boundaries. This possessory right is not limited
to a depth of foreseeable use, as in the case of
superjacent airspace, but extends to all parts
of the subsoil and to all caverns and containing
spaces. Accordingly, the fact that a use of a
stratum for gas storage may not be foreseeable
to a particular land owner is not material.
147 It is a startling proposition that a thing of val-
ue to its would-be acquirer (for which he would
otherwise have to pay) can be taken without
compensation. . . . Value in everyday life and
law . . . is not what a thing is worth to an
owner who cannot or will not develop it him-
self, but its market value, Which means what
buyers will pay for it. Discussion Notes, 21
0. & G. R. 282 (1965).
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excepted from liability entries or invasions of land causing no harm and
resulting from reckless, negligent, or extra hazardous activity, this section
did not cover intentional invasions or entries. Intentional invasions resulted
in liability although they caused no harm.14 8 The same is true under the
more recent formulations of these sections in Restatement (Second) of
Torts. 14 9 Significantly, while the codification was altered to require, in effect,
a showing of actual harm for liability for invasions or entries into the air-
space above another's land, the provisions on subsurface entries were left
unchanged. 15 0
Though Keeton and Jones suggest the possibility that a distinction
might be drawn, for purposes of determining liability, between cases
when the act is committed for the purpose of causing the invasion
and cases "... when the act is performed with knowledge that the
invasion will result . . . ," but without a definite purpose to bring it
about, 15 1 the law has made no such distinction. 152 In any case, many oc-
currences of gas migration may be deliberately caused by storage operators
who knowingly inject more gas than the original reservoir can hold.153
In depleted oil and gas fields, excessive injection ultimately not only dis-
places the water which has filled the depleted pore spaces, but also
pushes the water out from under the gas and leads to lateral migration of
the gas. 154 In these situations, the actions of the storage operator in caus-
ing a subsurface invasion might be said to be purposeful as well as know-
ing. Thus, under the modern formulations of trespass law, a case of tres-
148 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 158, 159, 163 (1934).
149 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 158, 159, 163 (1965).
150 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (1965) provides:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), a
trespass may be committed on, beneath, or
above the surface of the earth. (2) Flight by
aircraft in the airspace above the land of
another is a trespass if, but only if, (a) it enters
into the immediate reaches of the air space next
to the land, and (b) it interferes substantially
with the other's use and enjoyment of his land.
151 Keeton & Jones, supra note 138, at 263.
152 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 163, Comments b & c (1965) allege:
If the actor intends to be upon the particular
piece of land, it is not necessary that he intend
to invade the other's interest in the exclusive
possession of his land.
In order that the actor may intentionally enter
a particular piece of land, it is not necessary
that he act for the purpose of entering. It is
enough that he knows that his conduct will
result in such an entry inevitably or to a sub-
stantial certainty.




pass can perhaps be made out against the gas company in many cases if
the examination of fault on the part of defendant is an honest one.
B. Technical Trespass
The real problem in these cases is a resolution of the conflict between
private property rights and corporate economic development in the public
interest. A focus on the intent of the defendant does not get at this funda-
mental issue. Rather, it obscures it. It is possible to hold that when a
storage operator deliberately causes the gas to migrate, an adjoining land-
owner's property rights may be technically interfered with, but that when
the migration has resulted from an accidental migration, the landowner's
property rights are not affected. But this would seem a rather artificial dis-
tinction. A better approach might be to assume a technical trespass and to
focus attention on what remedies would best serve the rights and needs
of the parties concerned and the public interest.
A finding of technical trespass and an award of damages commensurate
with the harm caused by that trespass appears to be the most appropriate
way of accommodating the competing interests within the context of a
traditional legal action. If a technical trespass is found, nominal damages
may be awarded when no clear harm is caused, and such damages may
be absorbed by the gas industry with little or no impact upon the retail
price structure of gas for the consuming public. 15 5 When substantial harm
does result, it is appropriate that the storage operator respond in dam-
ages, since the cost of damage should be borne by the party or economic
activity causing it.
155 Proper awards in trespass actions should approximate condemnation awards and
voluntary compensation for the same rights, except perhaps in rare cases where
substantial damages are caused by the trespass.
The costs should therefore not mean too large a burden on the gas industry.
This is evidenced by the small proportion of land investments for storage rights
relative to total investments for underground storage operations. At the end of
1966, for example, Michigan Gas Storage Company's investment in land, lease-
holds, and storage rights totalled only $731,271 compared to a total investment
in underground storage plant (including, inter alia, gas rights, wells, structures
compression station equipment, and measuring equipment) of $21,135,880.
ANNUAL REPORT OF MICHIGAN GAS STORAGE COMPANY TO THE FEDERAL
POWER COMMISSION 502 (1967). Similarly, Michigan Consolidated Gas Com-
pany's investment in land, leaseholds, and storage rights for gas storage at the
end of 1966 totalled $1,174,949.52, while its total underground storage plant
investment, including $22,666,683.78 worth of gas in storage, came to $53,-
352,467.74. ANNUAL REPORT OF MICHIGAN CONSOLIDATED GAS COMPANY TO
THE MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 502 (1967). Comparable figures
for Consumers Power Company were $7,033,800.59 worth of land, leaseholds,
and storage rights and a total plant investment in underground storage of
$82,164,417.83, including $35,603,151.78 worth of storage gas. ANNUAL REPORT




Such an approach will have another advantage. If storage operators
neglect to acquire storage rights from a landowner, a trespass action may
be the landowner's only remedy for vindicating the same rights which the
gas company has voluntarily recognized in others. To demand a showing
of damages as the prerequisite for any relief might render the trespass
action ineffectual in many cases as a device for equalizing treatment of all
landowners whose property interests are affected by the storage project.
But a finding of technical trespass in the absence of any demonstration of
damages may result in the awarding of minimal damages close to the lowest
rates of compensation voluntarily paid to the landowners by the gas
companies.
C. Injunction
If a trespass is found under either the technical trespass or nuisance
approach, the coordinate question arises whether equitable relief will be
granted against such trespass. While the majority rule may be said to be
that a continuing trespass to land is sufficient cause to render a remedy
at law inadequate and to justify equitable relief in order to avoid a multi-
plicity of actions and the formation of a prescriptive easement, 15 6 the rule
frequently has been subjected to significant qualifications.' 57 Thus, it has
been held that an injunction will only be issued to avoid irreparable in-
jury.15s It has also been held that an injunction will not be issued against
a trespass to property when the damage caused is speculative or nomi-
nal.1 59 Under either of these qualifications, it would seem that an injunc-
tion against the storing of gas would be inappropriate.
The general rule as to trespass to land should not be applicable to a
situation such as this in which an injunction would seriously interfere with,
or even preclude, economic activity in the public interest. In most cases,
the practical effect of an available injunction would be to force storage
operators to pay exorbitant compensation to landowners for storage rights.
The cost, of course, will be passed on to the public, but it is improper to
view this as a desirable distribution of loss. It will mean, on the one hand,
an excessive payment to a property owner for a property right which may,
in fact, have been of little intrinsic value and, on the other hand, the im-
position of higher retail costs on an essential public fuel which should be
made available at low prices.
It is at this point that the nuisance approach advocated by Keeton
and Jones may be brought to bear upon the problem most effectively.160
Such an approach has been described as the "comparative injury doc-
15 6 See Annot., 32 A.L.R. 463 (1924); Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 310 (1958).
157 Id.
158 Pittsburgh, S.T.W.R. Co. v. Fiske, 123 Fed. 760 (1903).
'
59 Sunray Oil Co. v. Cortez Oil Co., 188 Okla. 690, 694, 112 P.2d 792, 795-96
(1941).
160 Keeton & Jones, supra note 138, at 269-70.
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trine", and it has been applied both implicitly'61 and explicitly1 62 to
trespass cases as well as nuisance cases. Perhaps the most analogous appli-
cation of the doctrine occurred in the case of Crescent Mining Co. v.
Silver King Mining Co.,163 where the court refused to grant an injunction
against the laying of defendant's pipeline which was to carry water to
defendant's mining plant:
The laying of the pipeline across the bar-
ren, valueless land caused no appreciable
injury to the plaintiff .... To restrain the
laying of the pipeline would cause the de-
fendant irreparable damage and destroy
and lay waste a mining industry of incalcu-
lable value, throw out of employment hun-
dreds of laborers, and seriously retard
and injure people of this community and
state in which the mine is located. To
grant the injunction asked for would work
a great and irreparable injury to the de-
fendant, without corresponding or any
benefit to the plaintiff; while to refuse it
would injure neither, but leave the plain-
tiff to its remedy at law, where it could
obtain such redress as the law should
award it. Under such circumstances, the
remedy at law being complete, the plain-
tiff should be required to resort to such
remedy. 164
Similarly, the granting of an injunction in the case of migrated storage
gas could cause irreparable harm to the natural gas industry.16 5 The mere
availability of an injunction could serve ultimately to inflate retail gas
prices. These factors undoubtedly moved the district court in Protz v.
Peoples Natural Gas Co.166 to indicate by way of dictum that it would
16tHenderson v. Longview, 111 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1937); Haye v.
Sweetman, 19 Nev. 376, 12 P. 504 (1887).
162 Pritchett v. Wade, 261 Ala. 156, 73 So.2d 533 (1954).
163 17 Utah 444, 54 P. 244 (1898).
164 Id. at 458, 54 P. at 248.
165 The balancing approach implicit in the comparative injury doctrine, of course,
does not absolutely preclude an injunction from being issued against gas storage
in the plaintiff's land. An injunction may, for example, be appropriate if the
storage gas is seriously interfering with the production of native minerals. E.g.,
Emerald Coal & Coke Co. v. Equitable Gas Co., 378 Pa. 591, 107 A.2d 734
(1954).
166 93 Pitts. L.J. 239, aff'd, 94 Pitts. L.J. 139 (1945).
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not enjoin the storage of gas in lands in which no storage rights were
held.167
Contrary to the implicit conclusion of the Protz court, it is normally
possible for a storage operator to comply with an injunction. The answer
lies not in artificially sealing the reservoir, a process which has not been
adequately developed for commercial use and may be economically unfeas-
ible,16s but rather in the simple reduction of gas quantities and pressure
in the reservoir until the plaintiff's land is no longer occupied by any storage
gas. But this makes an injunction no more, palatable. If "over-pressures"' 69
created by excessive gas injection lead to expansion of the storage field
beyond its original boundaries, the law should not invoke such sanctions
as an injunction or a loss of ownership upon the storage operator.1 7 0
Certainly, there is no intent on the part of the storage operator to abandon
this gas. More fundamentally, the difficulty of finding suitable geological
conditions for a reservoir in locations where storage facilities are needed1 71
167 The court said:
In view of our findings of fact it is unnecessary
to consider the question of the public interest
involved in the maintenance of large under-
ground gas pools within reach of metropolitan
areas where industrial, commercial, and residen-
tial consumers are to be served. Such interest,
however, undoubtedly exists, and if a choice
were required between conserving the public
interest and the enforcement of an individual
property owner's alleged underground rights,
such as contended for, the former must con-
trol. Id. at 244-45.
168 Interview with Professor Katz, supra note 8; Interview with
supra note 14.
169 "Over-pressures" as used in this context will mean pressures
viously existing in the reservoir in its virgin state.
170 It has been suggested
Professor Landes,
above those pre-
• . . that "pool pressure" should not exceed the
original rock pressure; otherwise, the court
could say with clear conscience that the op-
erator drove his "geese" to his neighbor's pond,
thus losing title thereto. Litz, supra note 5, at
157.
171 The geological features necessary for a storage project are the same as those
required for the commercial accumulation of native oil and gas in reservoirs.
These have been described as:
(1) a porous, permeable zone of sufficient
thickness to contain large quantities of oil
and gas; (2) an overlying impervious bed; (3)
an underlying seal, such as a water-saturated
zone or a pinch-out of the oil-bearing stra-
tum . . . ; and (4) some type of structural
feature, or a discontinuity of the porous,
permeable beds, or a combination of the two
that provided a trap in which the petroleum or
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and the expense of developing such reservoirs 172 are too great to preclude
an expansion of the original field in this way. Also, reservoirs will become
proportionately less expensive to operate as they grow larger because the
fraction of gas needed as cushion gas will thereby decrease.17 3 Opportuni-
ties to expand the storage field may become especially critical as the de-
mand for gas increases. The plaintiffs in these cases should therefore be
left to their action at law.
V. Conclusion
Aside from cases applying the laws of Texas and Pennsylvania, no jur-
isdiction has explicitly, and without qualification, refuted the legal proposi-
tion that gas injected for storage is subject to the rule of capture. In the
majority of states where there are substantial investments in storage proj-
ects, the question remains unresolved.
It is clear, however, that the rule should be expressly rejected for the
following reasons: (I) even in cases in which the storage operator deliber-
ately forces injected gas to migrate into property in which no storage
rights have been obtained, no intent to abandon the injected gas can be pre-
sumed; (2) expansion of suitable storage fields near consumer markets
should be facilitated to reduce supply costs; and (3) application of the
rule of capture would encourage landowners in jurisdictions with inade-
quate eminent domain procedures to demand exorbitant compensation from
gas companies, thus either compelling these companies to charge the con-
sumer a higher rate for gas or encouraging them to take extra-legal steps
to obtain adequate storage.
Even if the subterranean storage of gas causes little real harm to land-
owners, the situation concerning compensation to landowners would seem
to demand a novel legal resolution. As matters stand, gas utilities may in-
advertently be making improper discriminations as to the amount of com-
pensation landowners will receive for storage rights under their lands and
as to the particular landowners who will be compensated.
The absence of suitable eminent domain legislation is largely responsible
for this situation, for it is then in the economic self-interest of the land-
owner to impede development of a storage reservoir until he can name his
own price. In the case of vitally needed storage reservoirs, landowners
natural gas accumulated and was preserved.
INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMMISSION, OIL
AND GAS PRODUCTION 16-17 (1951).
Reservoirs depleted of native oil or gas may not always be sufficiently permeable
to meet the need for rapid injection and withdrawal in storage reservoirs.
Interview with Ray Markel, supra note 25.
172 The first significant gas storage reservoir developed in Iowa cost in excess of
ten million dollars to develop, exclusive of gas injected for storage. Pitsenbarger
v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 198 F. Supp. 665 (S.D. Iowa 1961).
173 D. KATZ, R. TEK, & K. COATS, UNDERGROUND STORAGE OF NATURAL GAS 65 (1965).
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who hold out longer will normally be able to command much higher prices
for identical interests.1 74
The inability to condemn storage areas is also the single most important
factor which may lead storage operators to undertake storage operations
without acquiring storage rights in lands in which the reservoir lies. The
possibility that storage projects will be seriously delayed or rendered too
expensive by obstinate landowners may create substantial economic pres-
sures on the storage operator to forego the acquisition of storage rights,
particularly in areas where alternative storage facilities do not exist. As a
result, certain landowners may not be compensated at all, while others,
with similar interests, will be compensated at an exorbitant rate.
Theoretically, a valid trespass action would afford the individual land-
owner an opportunity to vindicate the same property rights which the gas
company, through purchase, lease, and condemnation, voluntarily recog-
nized in others. But a trespass action is a less than efficacious technique
for vindicating the rights of landowners on an equal basis. This inade-
quacy of trespass actions results from ignorance of landowners as to the
presence of gas under their land, from the considerable effort and ex-
pense of bringing a legal action, and from the extreme difficulty of prov-
ing damage if an action is brought. It is submitted that the answer lies in
statutory provision for compulsory acquisition of all storage rights within
the reservoir, coupled with state administrative procedures for resolving
any disputes which may arise.
The following statute is presented to suggest a legislative approach for
implementing the three fundamental proposals set forth in this article:
(1) rejection of the proposition that title to gas is lost when it is injected
for storage, or that such gas may be captured when it migrates into lands
in which no storage rights are held; (2) adoption of eminent domain legis-
lation without percentage requirements; and (3) provision for mandatory
acquisition of all storage rights within the reservoir, with administrative
procedures by which property owners whose lands may be affected by the
storage project can press their claims. The proposed statute is not intended
as a panacea for all the gas storage problems which may arise. Definitional
matters, protection of other resources, enforcement questions, and other
details are adequately handled by existing legislation and are not treated
herein.
174 In one storage field, for example, Consumers Power Gas Company of Jackson,
Michigan paid $7.50 to $10.00 per acre for the storage rights in fee, but it
could not acquire interests for reasonable compensation in a percentage of the
land sufficient to permit it to condemn the remaining needed interests. Thus,
it was necessary to pay some landowners $120.00 per acre for virtually identical
interests. Interview with Herman Fruechtenicht, supra note 58.
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Proposed Gas Storage Act
Section 1 Underground Storage Permits
(a) No underground reservoir shall
be devoted to the storage of gas unless
the prospective operator of such reservoir
shall have received from the state con-
servation commission a storage permit.
The application for said permit shall in-
clude the following:
(1) A map showing the location and
boundaries of the proposed reservoir.
(2) A report containing sufficient data
to show that the reservoir is adaptable
for storage purposes.
(3) A written agreement signed by the
applicant providing that said applicant
shall thereafter within a reasonable time
acquire, through negotiation or condem-
nation, any outstanding storage rights in
the reservoir acreage.
(b) Upon issuance of said storage per-
mit, the storage operator shall publish a
notice concerning its prospective storage
-project, with a map thereof, not less than
once in each week for four successive
weeks in a newspaper to be designated by
the conservation commission.
(c) Every storage operator shall file
with the conservation commission an an-
nual report showing any change in the
amount of gas contained in its storage
reservoirs and the size or area of such
reservoirs.
Comment
Requirement of a storage permit represents the basic framework for
state regulation of gas storage operations. The remainder of this statute,
in fact, builds upon compliance by the storage operator with the condi-
tions for issuance of a storage permit set forth in Section 1.
It is clear that such conditions reflect three basic concerns: (1) that
storage operations be practicable in the designated reservoir; (2) that ade-
quate information regarding the project be conveyed to the appropriate
state agency and to affected landowners; and (3) that compulsory acqui-
sition of storage rights be prescribed.
Subsections (a) (3) and (b) are perhaps most notable. No provision
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comparable to subsection (b) can be found among existing gas storage acts
for giving landowners notice that their lands may be penetrated by the
injected storage gas. On the other hand, mandatory acquisition of all stor-
age rights within a reservoir as a condition for issuance of a storage per-
mit is provided only in the New York legislation,17 5 from which Section 1
is largely derived.
It should be noted that the proposed statute omits language from the
New York formulation providing that a storage permit may only be issued
after 75% of the storage rights have been obtained. The New York pro-
vision effectively prohibits condemnation of storage rights until 75% of
the interests have been voluntarily acquired, since the eminent domain
power may not be invoked without a storage permit. As will be described
in the Comment to Section 2 of this statute, such a requirement serves no
positive function.
Section 2 Condemnation
Any corporation empowered to pro-
duce, transport, distribute, or store gas
within this state for ultimate public use,
which holds an underground storage per-
mit from the conservation commission,
and which after reasonable effort is un-
able to obtain rights in real property
necessary for examination, preparation,
operation, or protection of the storage res-
ervoir shall have the authority to acquire
such rights by condemnation. The con-
demnation procedure may be invoked
hereunder irrespective of what percentage
of the interests in the storage reservoir
have been acquired by grant, lease, or
other agreement.
Comment
The first sentence of this section is derived from §86 of the New York
Conservation Law.' 76 The language leaves no doubt that protective acreage
may be condemned thereunder.
Under the second sentence, it is clear that condemnation may be avail-
able even when few or no storage rights have been voluntarily obtained by
the storage operator. But despite the absence of percentage requirements,
it will not be possible for gas companies to condemn indiscriminately un-
der the proposed statute. Section 2 requires, as do many existing statutes,
175 N.Y. CONSERV. § 85 (McKinney 1967).
1761d. § 86.
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that the rights condemned be necessary for storage purposes.' 7 7 Similarly,
a reasonable effort to negotiate for the interests must precede invocation of
the eminent domain action.178 The requirement of a storage permit also
insures that the reservoir in which condemnation is proposed has been
determined to be suitable for storage purposes. It is therefore clear that a
percentage requirement for condemnation would serve no useful function
in the proposed statute.
Section 3 Administrative Determination
of Storage Rights
(a) Any property owner whose lands
lie within a reasonable distance of the
storage reservoir, as indicated by maps
filed under Section 1 of this act, may, if
he has not been compensated for storage
rights within a reasonable time after the
storage permit was acquired, petition the
conservation commission for a determina-
tion that his land has been penetrated by
the storage gas.
(b) Upon receipt of such petition, the
commission shall initiate an investigation
of the site of the reservoir to determine
whether the injected gas has penetrated
the petitioner's land. The storage operator
shall make available to the commission
for its consideration all geological and res-
ervoir engineering studies and other infor-
mation within its possession or control
concerning the underground storage project.
(c) Failing prior settlement of the issue
between the storage operator and the peti-
tioner, a hearing upon the petition shall
be held by the commission which shall
determine whether or not the petitioner's
land falls within the reservoir and the
amount of compensation, if any, to which
the petitioner is entitled. Compensation
shall be calculated according to the fair
market value of the property interest ap-
propriated and by the extent of damage,
if any, to the residue of petitioner's prop-
erty.
177 See notes 28-30 supra.
178 See note 50 supra.
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(d) The storage operator or the peti-
tioner may commence a civil action in a
court of competent jurisdiction to test the
lawfulness and reasonableness of the com-
mission's final order. The burden of proof
in such action shall be upon the party
complaining of such order, and such order
shall be deemed prima facie valid.
Comment
Language in subsections (b) and (d) is derived from §§ 93-806 and
93-808 of the Georgia Underground Gas Storage Act,179 which cover the
separate problem of challenging applications for storage permits.
Section 3 presents a framework for providing expedient and inexpensive
state administrative procedures whereby landowners may have their rights
determined without the economically prohibitive burden of proof problems
inherent in every trespass action of this sort. Determinations of such rights
will be based upon impartial investigations by state experts as well as upon
submissions of evidence and argument by the parties involved.
Section 4 Rights to the Storage Gas
All gas which previously has been re-
duced to possession, and which lawfully is
injected into an underground storage res-
ervoir, shall be deemed the property of
the injector. In no event shall such gas
be subject to the right of any person other
than the injector to produce, take, re-
duce to possession, or otherwise interfere
with or exercise any control thereover,
irrespective of whether such gas has mi-
grated into lands in which the storage op-
erator has no storage rights.
Comment
Excepting the final clause, Section 4 is derived from a combination of
§88 of the New York Conservation LawSO and §100-9-7 of the Colorado
statutes.' 18 The section gives more explicit protection to the storage oper-
ator concerned with maintaining his rights in the storage gas than any
existing statutory language.
179 GA. CoDa ANN. §§ 93-806, 93-808 (Supp. 1967).
1s0 N.Y. CONSERV. § 88 (McKinney 1967).
181 CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 100-9-7 (1963).
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